informal provability
Nov. 12th, 2008 02:54 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
My current mindfuck is Hannes Leitgeb. He makes me want to abandon the "semantic web" for the "schema-ic web".
I enjoy it because he seems like a AI-logician who is thinking about mathematics as a cognitive phenomenon... this is the perspective he uses to shed light on the apparent paradoxes that arise when we simultaneously consider its Formalistic and Platonistic characters1 He focuses on the following issue: if formal and informal provability are extensionally equivalent, then what do the incompleteness theorems imply about provability? "Are There True but Informally Unprovable Statements?" a.k.a. "Are there absolutely undecidable statements?" My take is: well, if you see one, you surely won't recognize it as such! How would you know it to be true? (I assume axioms are not included)
To get there, he builds a theory of cognitive representations -- how mathematicians might represent graphs, integers, etc.
I'm halfway done, might post highlights later.
1 - At least that's what I was into, when I was into these ideas.
I enjoy it because he seems like a AI-logician who is thinking about mathematics as a cognitive phenomenon... this is the perspective he uses to shed light on the apparent paradoxes that arise when we simultaneously consider its Formalistic and Platonistic characters1 He focuses on the following issue: if formal and informal provability are extensionally equivalent, then what do the incompleteness theorems imply about provability? "Are There True but Informally Unprovable Statements?" a.k.a. "Are there absolutely undecidable statements?" My take is: well, if you see one, you surely won't recognize it as such! How would you know it to be true? (I assume axioms are not included)
To get there, he builds a theory of cognitive representations -- how mathematicians might represent graphs, integers, etc.
I'm halfway done, might post highlights later.
1 - At least that's what I was into, when I was into these ideas.
(no subject)
Date: 2008-11-12 12:53 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2008-11-12 04:40 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2008-11-12 07:25 pm (UTC)exactly!
(no subject)
Date: 2008-11-12 09:02 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2008-11-13 05:32 am (UTC)_Greg
(no subject)
Date: 2008-11-13 07:40 am (UTC)Leitgeb (probably following others) uses it as a weakening of what I would call "formal concept"... maybe it's also a more interactive idea than formal concepts: you understand mathematical concepts when you see them in action... just like you can understand a machine by seeing its motion, rather than its implementation. This is for the same reason why it is possible to think of an image but not be able to paint it: we don't immediately know how to ground our high-level percepts into low-level stimuli.
Painters spend years learning to dominate their own illusions.
(no subject)
Date: 2008-11-20 12:33 am (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2008-11-20 08:28 pm (UTC)There are very few people who seem to have taken seriously the notion that intelligence is a graceful coordinated use of multiple forms of knowledge embedded in different representation systems. Raj Reddy's Blackboard architecture and some of the Schema and Frame systems are the rare exceptions. It is particularly important to unite declarative and procedural views, i.e. to give strategic procedural support to a declarative system, e.g., automatization creating procedures which can be reviewed and updated as needed.
I'm pleased that you are aware of schemata and of this kind of work. Schemata were much more than weak concepts, but they could include a very flexible fuzzy model with partial commitment to more formal models and procedures. They are the most advanced knowledge representation system I am aware of, and just waiting to be exploited in new forms.
_Greg