From a comment I just wrote to
jcreed.
Another thing I asked Pfenning about was the proper interpretation of sentences in Linear Logics (it might as well have been about non-monotonic logics, or para-consistent logics (thanks to
quale for the reminder)). My inclination would be to say that these are "logics" only in the mathematical sense, not in the philosophical sense (i.e. In what I call "philosophical logics", sentences are about real truth. In particular, excluded middle and monotonicity hold.). But when we talk about agents' beliefs, we are in an intensional context, and these two no longer need to hold.
If we claim that sentences of such logics are meaningful, then we should be able to translate them into sentences in philosophical logics, e.g. temporal logics, by jumping out of the agent, and into an outsider's "objective perspective". But I don't see anyone bothering to do this.
For an illustration of what I mean:
While non-monotonic logic can model an agent's belief revision, we know that sentences in this logic are not to be judged as modeling truth. When we see a pair of sentences like:
we know that
Therefore, if we want to use a true philosophical logic, we should write something like:
Real reasoning involves reflection. Logicians often don't care enough about reflection.
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Another thing I asked Pfenning about was the proper interpretation of sentences in Linear Logics (it might as well have been about non-monotonic logics, or para-consistent logics (thanks to
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If we claim that sentences of such logics are meaningful, then we should be able to translate them into sentences in philosophical logics, e.g. temporal logics, by jumping out of the agent, and into an outsider's "objective perspective". But I don't see anyone bothering to do this.
For an illustration of what I mean:
While non-monotonic logic can model an agent's belief revision, we know that sentences in this logic are not to be judged as modeling truth. When we see a pair of sentences like:
X |- Z
X, Y |/- Z
we know that
|-
can't possibly refer to truth (afterall, truth is monotonic). Instead, |-
must refer to the agent's beliefs and reasoning processes. Furthermore, this formalism is vague about what refers to the agent's beliefs about facts, what refers to the agent's beliefs about what inferences are valid, or whether the agent's inferences follow this logic blindly, without reflection.Therefore, if we want to use a true philosophical logic, we should write something like:
B( B(X) ||- B(Z) )
(agent believes that: belief in X, in the default case, justifies belief in Z)B( B(X) /\ B(Y) ||/- B(Z) )
(agent believes that: belief in X, when accompanied by belief in Y, in the default case, does not justify belief in Z)Real reasoning involves reflection. Logicians often don't care enough about reflection.