the Explanatory Gap - notes
Nov. 5th, 2003 01:40 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
guslPhilosophy of Cognition, I have a presentation about the Explanatory Gap. It's due in about 13 hours.
If you think you can help, please give feedback:
The Explanatory Gap
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kinds of Consciousness
* Cognitive Consciousness: internal cognitive representations, conscious computational tasks, etc.
* Phenomenal Consciousness: feeling (aka "sentience")
It is with the latter that we are concerned in this presentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reductive Explanations
Water is explained by H2O
Thermodynamics is explained by Statistical Mechanics
etc.
But phenomenal consciousness is not explained by a physicalist theory of the brain. And it cannot be. Even a complete understanding of the brain would not be enough to answer "why does it feel that way?" satisfactorily
EXAMPLE: PAIN, REDNESS, HORNINESS, etc. may correspond to specific brain states, but knowing the states does not explain why they feel "painful", "red" or "horny".
This is the explanatory gap: reductive physical explanations of phenomenal events cannot be satisfactory. Chalmers call this "the Hard Problem of Consciousness".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why the Explanations Cannot Be Satisfactory
Reductive physicalist explanations cannot work for consciousness it would be attempting to reduce subjective concepts to objective concepts. (however, it would be wrong to conclude that consciousness can't be fully physical)
Phenomenal consciousness is inherently made up of subjective concepts: we can have a functionalist theory of pain, i.e.: why a subject reacts the way he does given a certain stimulus, but we cannot even be sure that the subject is not a zombie, let alone know what conscious state a physical state causes, since only the subject himself can experience his phenomenal consciousness.
ILLUSTRATION OF A ZOMBIE ILLUSTRATION OF MISATTRIBUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
REVERSE OF A ZOMBIE: future neuroscientist who lives in a black&white room. Has a complete understanding of human brain and behavior, but does not know what it is like to experience "RED".
We can have an understanding of the relationship between brain processes and objectively-observable (functionalist) qualities, however, phenomenal experience is irreducibly subjective: Physical, reductionistic explanations do not answer "Why does this physical pattern in the brain cause this feeling?".
Chalmers: "The trouble is that physical theories are best suited to explaining why systems have a certain physical structure and how they perform various functions. Most problems in science have this form; to explain life, for example, we need to describe how a physical system can reproduce, adapt and metabolize. But consciousness is a different sort of problem entirely, as it goes beyond the explanation of structure and function."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inherent Subjectivity of Phenomenal Consciousness
Phenomenal consciousness is thus inherently subjective, since it cannot be verified in an observer-independent way.
Phenomenology is about attempting to describe consciousness in a way understandable to a third-party observer, but this project is bound to failure: you can never REALLY know what someone else's experience like, especially if they are very different from you, for example, a bat.
cartoon
Do you see what I'm seeing?
Do you feel what I'm feeling?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can we bridge the gap?
Chalmers's position: Gap is Unbridgeable with only Physical Theories
"Toward this end, I propose that conscious experience be considered a fundamental feature, irreducible to anything more basic. The idea may seem strange at first, but consistency seems to demand it. In the 19th century it turned out that electromagnetic phenomena could not be explained in terms of previously known principles. As a consequence, scientists introduced electromagnetic charge as a new fundamental entity and studied the associated fundamental laws. Similar reasoning should apply to consciousness. If existing fundamental theories cannot encompass it, then something new is required."
"Thus, a complete theory will have two components: physical laws, telling us about the behavior of physical systems from the infinitesimal to the cosmological, and what we might call psychophysical laws, telling us how some of those systems are associated with conscious experience. These two components will constitute a true theory of everything. "
So we need Psychophysical Theories
Chalmers's Psychophysical Laws (non-physical laws): bridge physical theories with phenomenal through phenomenology (were are now outside of the realm of science).
Some Psychophysical Laws:
* Organizational Invariance: similar stimuli give rise to similar perceptions.
* (possible law): Such-and-such pattern in the brain feels "tingly"
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can we bridge the gap?
Tye summarizes some of the main positions:
* QUALOPHILIA: experiences have irreducibly subjective, non-physical qualities.
* CLOSET QUALOPHILIA: experiences are irreducibly subjective, however this is compatible with them being physical.
* PHYSICALISM, FINGERS CROSSED: The gap may be bridged some day, but today we have no clear conception as to how phenomenal states could be physical.
* PHYSICALISM, DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC: The gap cannot be bridged because humans are cognitively closed. There is an explanation, but it is beyond our cognitive grasp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tye's Criticism of Standard Positions
Tye: "All of these positions have the idea that if experiences are indeed fully physical, then an explanation is needed, but has not yet been found, for why the relevant physical states and qualities feel on the inside as they do"
What they all have in common is:
experiences are fully physical Þ explanation is needed
P(e) Þ EN
The first two deny physicalism, whereas the latter two affirm it.
Tye believes this implication to be false: "the so-called 'explanatory gap' derives largely from a failure to recognize the special features of phenomenal concepts. These concepts, I maintain, have a character that not only explains why we have the intuition that something important is left out by the physical (and/or functional) story but also explains why this intuition is not to be trusted. "
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tye's position: There is no gap
Sounds like a semantic argument to me.
Since it is a priori impossible to explain something irreducible, then there is nothing which needs to be explained.
Objective (Indexical) Concepts Concepts vs Subjective (Phenomenal) Concepts
Objective Concept:
Subjective Concept: Red
Perspectival Subjectivity
Fully comprehending a phenomenal state S requires adopting the point of view provided by undergoing S.
Some concepts have an a priori connection with the first person concept, I. e.g.: "here", "now".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Physicalism: Ax(P(x))
Causal Closure: causes(x,y) /\ P(y) Þ P(x))
Duality: ~ M \ P = { }
Mental Cause: Ex,y(M(x) /\ P(y) /\ causes(x,y))
Suppose Ex,y(M(x) /\ P(y) /\ causes(x,y)
call them x0, y0
then M(x0) /\ P(y0) /\ causes(x0,y0)
then P(x0)
If you think you can help, please give feedback:
The Explanatory Gap
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kinds of Consciousness
* Cognitive Consciousness: internal cognitive representations, conscious computational tasks, etc.
* Phenomenal Consciousness: feeling (aka "sentience")
It is with the latter that we are concerned in this presentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reductive Explanations
Water is explained by H2O
Thermodynamics is explained by Statistical Mechanics
etc.
But phenomenal consciousness is not explained by a physicalist theory of the brain. And it cannot be. Even a complete understanding of the brain would not be enough to answer "why does it feel that way?" satisfactorily
EXAMPLE: PAIN, REDNESS, HORNINESS, etc. may correspond to specific brain states, but knowing the states does not explain why they feel "painful", "red" or "horny".
This is the explanatory gap: reductive physical explanations of phenomenal events cannot be satisfactory. Chalmers call this "the Hard Problem of Consciousness".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why the Explanations Cannot Be Satisfactory
Reductive physicalist explanations cannot work for consciousness it would be attempting to reduce subjective concepts to objective concepts. (however, it would be wrong to conclude that consciousness can't be fully physical)
Phenomenal consciousness is inherently made up of subjective concepts: we can have a functionalist theory of pain, i.e.: why a subject reacts the way he does given a certain stimulus, but we cannot even be sure that the subject is not a zombie, let alone know what conscious state a physical state causes, since only the subject himself can experience his phenomenal consciousness.
ILLUSTRATION OF A ZOMBIE ILLUSTRATION OF MISATTRIBUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
REVERSE OF A ZOMBIE: future neuroscientist who lives in a black&white room. Has a complete understanding of human brain and behavior, but does not know what it is like to experience "RED".
We can have an understanding of the relationship between brain processes and objectively-observable (functionalist) qualities, however, phenomenal experience is irreducibly subjective: Physical, reductionistic explanations do not answer "Why does this physical pattern in the brain cause this feeling?".
Chalmers: "The trouble is that physical theories are best suited to explaining why systems have a certain physical structure and how they perform various functions. Most problems in science have this form; to explain life, for example, we need to describe how a physical system can reproduce, adapt and metabolize. But consciousness is a different sort of problem entirely, as it goes beyond the explanation of structure and function."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inherent Subjectivity of Phenomenal Consciousness
Phenomenal consciousness is thus inherently subjective, since it cannot be verified in an observer-independent way.
Phenomenology is about attempting to describe consciousness in a way understandable to a third-party observer, but this project is bound to failure: you can never REALLY know what someone else's experience like, especially if they are very different from you, for example, a bat.
cartoon
Do you see what I'm seeing?
Do you feel what I'm feeling?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can we bridge the gap?
Chalmers's position: Gap is Unbridgeable with only Physical Theories
"Toward this end, I propose that conscious experience be considered a fundamental feature, irreducible to anything more basic. The idea may seem strange at first, but consistency seems to demand it. In the 19th century it turned out that electromagnetic phenomena could not be explained in terms of previously known principles. As a consequence, scientists introduced electromagnetic charge as a new fundamental entity and studied the associated fundamental laws. Similar reasoning should apply to consciousness. If existing fundamental theories cannot encompass it, then something new is required."
"Thus, a complete theory will have two components: physical laws, telling us about the behavior of physical systems from the infinitesimal to the cosmological, and what we might call psychophysical laws, telling us how some of those systems are associated with conscious experience. These two components will constitute a true theory of everything. "
So we need Psychophysical Theories
Chalmers's Psychophysical Laws (non-physical laws): bridge physical theories with phenomenal through phenomenology (were are now outside of the realm of science).
Some Psychophysical Laws:
* Organizational Invariance: similar stimuli give rise to similar perceptions.
* (possible law): Such-and-such pattern in the brain feels "tingly"
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can we bridge the gap?
Tye summarizes some of the main positions:
* QUALOPHILIA: experiences have irreducibly subjective, non-physical qualities.
* CLOSET QUALOPHILIA: experiences are irreducibly subjective, however this is compatible with them being physical.
* PHYSICALISM, FINGERS CROSSED: The gap may be bridged some day, but today we have no clear conception as to how phenomenal states could be physical.
* PHYSICALISM, DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC: The gap cannot be bridged because humans are cognitively closed. There is an explanation, but it is beyond our cognitive grasp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tye's Criticism of Standard Positions
Tye: "All of these positions have the idea that if experiences are indeed fully physical, then an explanation is needed, but has not yet been found, for why the relevant physical states and qualities feel on the inside as they do"
What they all have in common is:
experiences are fully physical Þ explanation is needed
P(e) Þ EN
The first two deny physicalism, whereas the latter two affirm it.
Tye believes this implication to be false: "the so-called 'explanatory gap' derives largely from a failure to recognize the special features of phenomenal concepts. These concepts, I maintain, have a character that not only explains why we have the intuition that something important is left out by the physical (and/or functional) story but also explains why this intuition is not to be trusted. "
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tye's position: There is no gap
Sounds like a semantic argument to me.
Since it is a priori impossible to explain something irreducible, then there is nothing which needs to be explained.
Objective (Indexical) Concepts Concepts vs Subjective (Phenomenal) Concepts
Objective Concept:
Subjective Concept: Red
Perspectival Subjectivity
Fully comprehending a phenomenal state S requires adopting the point of view provided by undergoing S.
Some concepts have an a priori connection with the first person concept, I. e.g.: "here", "now".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Physicalism: Ax(P(x))
Causal Closure: causes(x,y) /\ P(y) Þ P(x))
Duality: ~ M \ P = { }
Mental Cause: Ex,y(M(x) /\ P(y) /\ causes(x,y))
Suppose Ex,y(M(x) /\ P(y) /\ causes(x,y)
call them x0, y0
then M(x0) /\ P(y0) /\ causes(x0,y0)
then P(x0)
![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
(no subject)
Date: 2003-11-04 05:17 pm (UTC)I think you mention her name :)
(no subject)
Date: 2003-11-04 05:21 pm (UTC)can you say that again?
(no subject)
Date: 2003-11-04 05:26 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2003-11-04 05:29 pm (UTC)maybe worth looking at
Date: 2003-11-04 08:46 pm (UTC)AV