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the human concepts of fairness, blame, etc
Aug. 8th, 2005 01:23 pmRobin Hanson - Is Fairness About Clear Fitness Signals?
I've often struggled with the concept of "fairness" (distinct from "justice" in the sense of "being wronged", which is relatively unproblematic, and can be formalized in terms of (social) contracts). "Fairness" here is about what feels right, absent any agreements.
The concept of "blame"/"responsibility" is similarly problematic (e.g. "when can you blame someone? what about the environment where he grew up? his genes?"), but at least it has a reason to exist: assigning blame can prevent future problems.
"Fairness", OTOH, seems like a quirky concept with no clear purpose. Why is it unfair to compete against a disabled person, while it's fair to compete with (and merciless beat) someone who is chronically lazy? We say this is the case because the lazy person chooses to be lazy. So humans have a folk theory of free will. (never mind the free-will / determinism debates).
Anyway, Robin Hanson provides an interesting answer to the above, without going into this question of attributing "choice": instead he focuses on the hypothesis that the outcomes of unfair dealings are poor signals of genetic fitness... although this doesn't explain why unfair games can be repulsive. Is this because they waste people's time, not satisfying their immense curiosity about others' genetic fitness? or because unfair games could give deceptive signals? Could it be that people are repulsed by the sight/knowledge of others struggling helplessly?
What about people who say that sweatshops are "unfair", even when they are a good deal for everyone involved? Are they framing the situation as a competition between boss and worker? Does it bother them that rich and poor are interacting in a capitalistic way?
(I'm reminded of a link about this: a theory of how things get "morally contamined" by association. Maybe it was a response to Amitai Etzioni)
I've often struggled with the concept of "fairness" (distinct from "justice" in the sense of "being wronged", which is relatively unproblematic, and can be formalized in terms of (social) contracts). "Fairness" here is about what feels right, absent any agreements.
The concept of "blame"/"responsibility" is similarly problematic (e.g. "when can you blame someone? what about the environment where he grew up? his genes?"), but at least it has a reason to exist: assigning blame can prevent future problems.
"Fairness", OTOH, seems like a quirky concept with no clear purpose. Why is it unfair to compete against a disabled person, while it's fair to compete with (and merciless beat) someone who is chronically lazy? We say this is the case because the lazy person chooses to be lazy. So humans have a folk theory of free will. (never mind the free-will / determinism debates).
Anyway, Robin Hanson provides an interesting answer to the above, without going into this question of attributing "choice": instead he focuses on the hypothesis that the outcomes of unfair dealings are poor signals of genetic fitness... although this doesn't explain why unfair games can be repulsive. Is this because they waste people's time, not satisfying their immense curiosity about others' genetic fitness? or because unfair games could give deceptive signals? Could it be that people are repulsed by the sight/knowledge of others struggling helplessly?
What about people who say that sweatshops are "unfair", even when they are a good deal for everyone involved? Are they framing the situation as a competition between boss and worker? Does it bother them that rich and poor are interacting in a capitalistic way?
(I'm reminded of a link about this: a theory of how things get "morally contamined" by association. Maybe it was a response to Amitai Etzioni)