From the Formal Epistemology conference

[gusl]

From the Formal Epistemology conference where easwaran is speaking:

Gabriella Pigozzi - Judgment aggregation without paradox: fusion operators at work

The combination of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. An example is a set of premises and a conclusion in which the latter is logically equivalent to the former. The problem with judgment aggregation is that when majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). This problem is known as the doctrinal paradox. The doctrinal paradox is a serious problem since it is not clear whether a collective outcome exists in these cases, and if it does, what it is like.

Rolf Haenni, Stephan Hartmann - Modeling Partially Reliable Information Sources

Daniel Steel - Must a Bayesian Accept the Likelihood Principle?

Andy Egan - Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory

Laura E. Schulz and Alison Gopnik - Causal Learning Across Domains