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guslHere's the game:
you want to go out and play soccer on Sunday
* If you go, your utility will depend on: (1) the weather, and (2) how many (and which) other people show up.
* If you stay at home, your utility is constant.
This is already complex enough, if you take into account the utilities of a complex social network (each player has a social-utility function over the set of which individuals come). It's already a hard coordination problem.
the benefits of planning ahead
But we also need to take into account the fact that many players benefit from scheduling themselves ahead of time (they can plan their other activities better). They want to plan ahead, counting on other people to be there.
This complicates things because other players will want to leave their decision as late as possible: they only want to play if the weather is good, and will be unwilling to make a commitment until they're fairly convinced that the weather will be decent. On the other hand, players will not want to commit unless they see other committed players. Should we reward early committers?
signalling
How can people signal the right degree of commitment, and how can we hold them accountable without being too rigid?
What are the best known solutions to this kind of problem? Does assuming rationality (or common-knowledge thereof) make a big difference?
This is very common problem in social situations. I bet the HikeTheGeek'ers would like to hear about any proposed solutions.
---
By the way, I have lost substantial utility in my life by trying too hard to optimize my social life. Mostly by doing nothing (the P's default under uncertainty).
you want to go out and play soccer on Sunday
* If you go, your utility will depend on: (1) the weather, and (2) how many (and which) other people show up.
* If you stay at home, your utility is constant.
This is already complex enough, if you take into account the utilities of a complex social network (each player has a social-utility function over the set of which individuals come). It's already a hard coordination problem.
the benefits of planning ahead
But we also need to take into account the fact that many players benefit from scheduling themselves ahead of time (they can plan their other activities better). They want to plan ahead, counting on other people to be there.
This complicates things because other players will want to leave their decision as late as possible: they only want to play if the weather is good, and will be unwilling to make a commitment until they're fairly convinced that the weather will be decent. On the other hand, players will not want to commit unless they see other committed players. Should we reward early committers?
signalling
How can people signal the right degree of commitment, and how can we hold them accountable without being too rigid?
What are the best known solutions to this kind of problem? Does assuming rationality (or common-knowledge thereof) make a big difference?
This is very common problem in social situations. I bet the HikeTheGeek'ers would like to hear about any proposed solutions.
---
By the way, I have lost substantial utility in my life by trying too hard to optimize my social life. Mostly by doing nothing (the P's default under uncertainty).