Scott Aaronson's
Is P Versus NP Formally Independent? is interesting.
My feeling is that it couldn't go the way of the Continuum Hypothesis, because if P=NP, then there is an algorithm that we can find. The CH, OTOH, does not entail the existence of anything concrete, whether it's assumed to be true or false.
P=NP
<=>
exists P-time-algorithm a ( a solves SAT )in other words:
P=NP
<=>
exists algorithm a, polynomial function f ( forall inputs i ( a halts after no more than f(size(i)) steps, outputting the answer to whether i is satisfiable) )
This is a Sigma_2 statement about Turing Machines. This means that it has an objective meaning, and must therefore be true or false. I suspect this also means that ZFC can decide it (if it can't, then ZFC is not "meaningful-statement complete", which is a bad thing).
The CH is a Sigma_n statement (maybe it can also be considered Pi_n, if there is no standard way to push negations), but it's not about Turing Machines. This means that the meaning of CH, to the extent that it has one, is dependent on "non-computable" axioms.
Can anyone help me formalize this argument?
Reading Section 6 ("Conclusion"), I see that Aaronson discusses this argument I just made, agreeing with it (but not formalizing it):
But in one crucial respect, P = NP is not at all like CH. It’s a Pi_2-sentence. It refers, not to a transfinite realm beyond human experience, but to machines, Boolean circuits, 1’s and 0’s.
Here’s a simple argument for why, if you accept the physical process criterion, then you should accept
that any Pi_alpha-sentence has a definite truth-value.
...
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Aaronson's paper seems to suggest that formalization can't make a proof more credible. I disagree with that, of course, but maybe I read too much into what he said and made a straw man.
via
patrissimo, I found
this very nice post that debunks "hypercomputation".